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The latest decision of the House of Lords in relation to the interpretation 
and application of the defence of diminished responsibility in R v Dietschmann1 
is to be welcomed as clarifying the issue of what may be regarded as an 
adequate judicial direction to the jury. The analysis of the defence has been 
problematic ever since its introduction in s 2 of the Homicide Act 1957.2 One 
possible explanation of the difficulties the defence has caused is the fact that it 
is an importation from Scots law, intended to ameliorate the dissatisfaction with 
the general defence of insanity. Accordingly, the defence has been shoe-horned 
into the complex common law in relation to homicide and sits uneasily with it.3
Be that as it may, a number of problems arising out of the introduction of 
the defence have never been satisfactorily resolved. While it is not the intention 
of the present article to offer a general review of the defence, the following 
points may be usefully made. The first pertains to the statutory definition of 
diminished responsibility as an “abnormality of mind”. This is restricted by the 
words contained in the parenthesis to s 2(1) as “arising from a condition of 
arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent causes or induced by 
disease or injury”. The definition is predicated on a psychiatric view of the 
* Principal Lecturer, Law Department, University of Greenwich. 
1  [2001] EWCA Crim 2052; [2003] UKHL 10. 
2 s 2(1) Homicide Act 1957: “Where a person kills or is a party to the killing of 
another, he shall not be convicted of murder if he was suffering from such an 
abnormality of mind (whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded 
development of mind or any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury) as 
substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his acts and omissions in doing or 
being a party to the killing”. Ss (2) shifts the burden of proving diminished 
responsibility on to the defence, while ss (3) provides that the effect of the defence if 
successful is to reduce the charge to that of manslaughter. Subsequent case law has 
preferred to use the term voluntary manslaughter, to distinguish it from the various 
categories of involuntary manslaughter. 
3  In R v Spriggs [1958] 1 All ER 300 at 303, Lord Goddard CJ described the defence 
as “a novelty in English law”.  
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causes of mental illness, thus making expert evidence crucial.4 Moreover, the 
definition incorporates both psychological causes (in terms of “syndromes”) as 
well as physiological causes (the underlying “organic” causes). This, however, 
is not sufficient of itself. It then becomes necessary for the jury to apply the 
remainder of the test in s 2(1), i.e. that the abnormality of mind had the 
causative effect of substantially impairing the mental responsibility of the 
defendant for his actions.5 This becomes “a moral-legal judgment”6 entirely 
separate from that of forensic psychiatry. It would appear that the judicial 
approach, in practice, has been to treat this in a rather elastic fashion. Ashworth 
puts it as follows: 
 
“The wording with which the Homicide Act 1957 introduced 
diminished responsibility is rather unsatisfactory, but judges, 
counsel, doctors, and juries have approached it with a 
compassionate pragmatism rather than with the rarefied verbal 
analysis too frequently encountered in English criminal law.”7
 
This may be welcomed as a compromise of the policy issues involved. 
However, the analysis may be viewed rather differently, in the manner 
suggested by Norrie: 
 
“The defence intermingles scientific and metaphysical 
discourses in a way that produces an amelioration of the law’s 
narrowness but on the basis of an intellectual muddle and 
compromise.”8
 
This is clear from cases such as Ahluwalia where a “major depressive 
4 The requirement of expert medical evidence for insanity is provided for in s 1, 
Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991. There is no specific 
statutory equivalent for diminished responsibility although Dix (1981) 74 Cr App R 
306 makes it clear that a jury may not return a verdict of voluntary manslaughter on the 
ground of diminished responsibility unless there is medical evidence that one of the 
causes specified in s 2(1) exists. 
5 Byrne [1960] 3 All ER 1 makes it clear that the medical testimony is not conclusive: 
the jury is not bound to accept the medical evidence and may consider the evidence as a 
whole. 
6  Alan Norrie Crime, Reason and History (London  Butterworths,  2nd edn 2001) p 
183. 
7 Andrew Ashworth Principles of the Criminal Law (Oxford OUP, 3rd edn 1999), p 
288. 
8  Norrie, op cit, p 184. 
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disorder” was considered capable of coming within the terms of the section.9  
Second, and leading on from this, there is no clear indication of the way in 
which the partial/specific defence of diminished responsibility and the general 
defence of insanity are to be reconciled.10 Both are, of course, legal and not 
medical concepts,11 but there is no rational and satisfactory manner of deciding 
when a mental “disorder”, used in its widest terms, is properly to be treated as 
an abnormality of mind, and when an abnormality of mind shades into insanity. 
There have been valiant judicial attempts at a drawing the distinction. In Byrne 
Lord Parker CJ ruled: 
 
“‘Abnormality of mind’, which has to be contrasted with the 
time-honoured expression in the M’Naghten Rules, ‘defect of 
reason’, means a state of mind so different from that of 
ordinary human beings that the reasonable man would term it 
abnormal.”12
 
In Byrne itself, three medical experts testified that the defendant, who had 
killed and mutilated a young woman, was a sexual psychopath suffering from 
“perverted sexual desires”.13 Nonetheless, all three experts were of the opinion 
that he was not insane within the technical requirements of the M’Naghten 
Rules, although it could be said that he was suffering from an abnormality of 
mind. While a trained legal mind may be capable of appreciating the 
distinction, based as it is on judgments (not without controversy) of 
psychopathy, it is doubtful that the ‘ordinary human beings” who sit on the jury 
are capable of doing so. This is even more so when the distinction would be 
equally incomprehensible to any psychiatrist called upon to testify for either the 
Crown or the defence. 
According to Norrie: 
 
“The law is essentially based on a conflict between two 
discourses While ‘abnormality of mind’ requires the testimony 
of psychiatrists (although it is not a proper psychiatric 
9  [1992] 4 All ER 889 at 900, per Lord Taylor CJ. 
10 The position is further complicated by the fact that, under s 6 of the Criminal 
Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, in those situations where the defence elects to present 
the defence of diminished responsibility, the prosecution may counter this by alleging 
insanity instead, or vice versa.  
11 This was a point made clear by the trial judge to the jury in the case under 
discussion; see [2001] EWCA Crim 2052, para 10. 
12  [1960] 3 All ER 1 at 4; emphasis added. 
13  Ibid at p 3. 
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concept), ‘substantial impairment of mental responsibility’ 
requires the moral judgment of the jury, and there is in logic no 
way of inferring the one from the other.… The question of the 
mental responsibility of the accused raises a metaphysical 
question of the freedom of the will which scientific discourse 
does not recognise and cannot answer.”14
 
To be fair, this is a matter recognised by the courts In Byrne, Lord Parker 
CJ acknowledged that the issue of whether the mental abnormality of the 
defendant impaired his mental responsibility was “incapable of scientific 
proof”;15 an accurate enough observation but not one guaranteed to advance the 
jury’s understanding or to assist in dealing with the question at hand. 
Scots law may be prepared, reasonably enough, to treat diminished 
responsibility as “partial insanity”. In HM Advocate v Braithwaite, Lord 
Cooper, relying on a line of authority, explained diminished responsibility to a 
Scottish jury as requiring “a state of mind which is bordering on, though not 
amounting to, insanity”.16 The English cases, however, are equivocal and 
sometimes even disapproving. While the Court of Appeal in Byrne was willing 
to tolerate terms such as “partial insanity” and “the borderline of insanity”, 
Archbold notes that it “will sometimes be inappropriate to direct the jury that 
the test is the borderline of insanity”17 while in Seers the Court of Appeal made 
it clear that there would be circumstances where this would even amount to a 
material misdirection.18 Referring again to the finding of the depression 
disorder in Ahluwalia, this could not in any way constitute either partial or 
borderline insanity. According to J C Smith: 
 
“Diminished responsibility has been pleaded with success in 
cases where one would have thought there was no chance of a 
defence of insanity succeeding – mercy killers, deserted 
spouses or disappointed lovers who killed while in a state of 
depression, persons with chronic anxiety states and so on.”19
 
Clearly, a direction based on partial or borderline insanity in cases such as 
these would amount to a misdirection. However, does permitting the defence in 
14  Norrie, op cit, p 183. 
15  Op cit, p 5. 
16 [1945] SC (J)55 at 57. 
17  Archbold para 19-73. 
18  (1984) 79 Cr App R 261. 
19  J C Smith Smith and Hogan on Criminal Law, (London: Butterworths, 10th edn 
2002) p 236. 
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the above situations not amount to a clear distortion of the language of s 2(1)? 
Third, a major difficulty arises when the defendant’s possible abnormality 
of mind is accompanied by intoxication. The defence of intoxication itself 
remains problematic in terms of the policy to be adopted in the juridical 
allocation of culpability. The present broad-brush approach of utilising the 
distinction between crimes of basic and specific intent, is even at its best, open 
to sceptical analysis.20 However, the scale of the complexity increases where 
the courts are faced with a defendant who, in addition to an abnormality of 
mind, has also voluntarily consumed either alcohol or drugs It was this 
particular aspect of the defence of diminished responsibility that arose for 
resolution in the case of R v Dietschmann.  
 
R V DIETSCHMANN: FACTS21
 
The defendant, Anthony Dietschmann, had embarked on a sexual 
relationship with a woman named Sarah who was in fact his aunt and who was 
more than twice his age. She was, moreover, a drug addict. The relationship 
caused the defendant to be ostracized by the rest of the family and lasted for 
about six months from July 1998 to November 1998. Their cohabitation ended 
when the defendant was remanded in custody for an unrelated offence. Sarah 
visited, wrote to him in prison and gave him a watch. While he was still in 
custody, Sarah resumed her drug-taking. The defendant gave her an ultimatum: 
he would end their relationship unless she solved her drug problem. He even 
went so far as to cut his wrists, although without fatal consequences Sarah died 
in June 1999 while the defendant was still in custody. Although a post-mortem 
later revealed that she had died from natural causes, the defendant firmly 
believed that she had committed suicide as a result of his being in custody as 
well as because of the ultimatum he had given her. He was allowed to attend 
her funeral and a couple of weeks later was released from remand. As this 
recital indicates, there were clear indications that the defendant was, to put it 
mildly, under considerable mental strain. 
After his release on the 2 July 1999, the defendant began to drink heavily. 
On the 13 July he was prescribed sleeping tablets and an anti-depressant, 
Prozac, by his GP. The later testimony of his sister was that throughout this 
period he was not behaving normally and was very insecure and upset. On the 
16 and 17 July there was evidence of considerable drinking. On the evening of 
20  The position may be summarised as follows: intoxication cannot be a defence to a 
crime of basic intent, while it may be taken into account in crimes of specific intent 
such as murder. See DPP v Majewski [1977] AC 443. 
21  The following facts are taken from the account in the reports of the Court of Appeal 
and the House of Lords. 
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the 17 July, the defendant and two companions had embarked on a drinking 
spree. By the time the eventual victim, Nicholas Davies, joined them, a bottle of 
whisky had been consumed while the defendant had also had a couple of pints 
of cider. Further alcohol was then purchased and drunk. Later, the defendant 
would tell the police that on the day in question he had drunk two bottles of 
cider, a bottle of whisky and about 8 cans of lager. The defendant and Davies 
started dancing, swinging their arms and jumping up and down. The watch 
given to the defendant by Sarah as a final gift was broken during this frenetic 
activity. The defendant alleged that Davies had broken the watch deliberately 
and punched him several times, insisting that he pay for it to be repaired. 
Davies refused. There then followed a particularly vicious and intense assault. 
Even after Davies stopped moving the defendant continued the assault, 
stamping and kicking his head, side and chest over 30 times Throughout this 
episode the defendant kept repeating that Davies had “pissed on Sarah’s grave” 
and deserved to die. Then he and another of the men (who had been present but 
had not taken any part in the assault) rolled the body in a rug and moved it into 
the next room. A forensic examination later revealed that Davies had thirty-one 
head injuries as well as injuries to the back, neck, chest, arms and legs His nose 
was broken on both sides, the brain was damaged and ribs were broken in seven 
places. 
Two further incidents should be noted at this point. The first was the 
defendant’s repeated, and unexplained, question of “where’s the ticket?” 
directed to the dead body. Second, the defendant telephoned his sister and told 
her that he had killed someone. His explanation was that he had been walking 
through a crematorium and had seen Davies pissing on the graves His sister’s 
testimony was that the telephone conversation lasted for about 47 minutes and 
that the defendant did not make much sense. The defendant then left the scene 
of the killing. When found by the police, he was disheveled and smelt of 
alcohol. He was, however, able to give his correct name and was cautioned and 
arrested. He was examined by a police surgeon who, oddly, certified the 
defendant as fit for detention and interview. During the interview the defendant 
elected to exercise his right to remain silent on his solicitor’s advice. Instead, he 
read out a prepared statement. This claimed that he had seen Davies urinate on 
rosebushes in the crematorium, which he thought disrespectful. He repeated his 
claim that Davies had broken the watch Sarah had given him and felt that this 
was “taking the piss out of Sarah”. He stated that the next thing he could recall 
was seeing Davies on the floor; he checked for breathing and a pulse but he was 
dead. The defendant was charged with murder but chose to plead voluntary 
manslaughter as a result of diminished responsibility. 
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THE DEFENDANT’S TESTIMONY 
 
At trial the central facts relied on by the Crown were admitted. In 
particular, the defendant repeated his belief that the watch had been broken by 
the victim and that the victim had been urinating on Sarah’s grave. He also 
testified that he had come to realise that the urinating incident had not actually 
happened. He further testified that, apart from the watch being broken and 
throwing a punch at Davies, he had no recollection of the events in question. 
However, he accepted that he must have been responsible for the injuries22 It is 
worth noting that on his own testimony, the defendant admitted to “being angry 
but not fuelled by drink”23 and that he was “not badly affected by alcohol”24 at 
the time of the attack. The reason for this admission, presumably, was in order 
to avoid the conclusion being drawn that the reason for the killing was the 




Lord Parker CJ in Byrne had opined that while the jury are not bound to 
accept the medical evidence, the “aetiology of the abnormality of mind … does, 
however, seem to be a matter to be determined on expert evidence”.25 In the 
instant case two psychiatrists tendered medical evidence, one each for the 
Crown and for the defence. It may be convenient to set out their testimony as 
follows: 
 
Dr Palmer (for the Crown): 
 
Dr Palmer had examined the defendant within three days of his arrest. She 
came to the conclusion that he was suffering from an abnormality of mind at 
the time of the offence. This took the form of an adjustment disorder. She was 
also of the opinion that there was present an alcohol dependence syndrome. The 
psychiatrist called for the defence had come to the conclusion that the 
defendant had experienced a transient psychotic state. Dr Palmer did not agree 
with this view. 
 
22  It would be interesting to speculate as to whether it would have been possible, on the 
basis of the facts and the defendant’s testimony, to have run an insanity defence within 
the first limb of the M’Naghten Rules, in that he did not know either the nature and 
quality of his acts. 
23  [2001] EWCA Crim 2052 at para 6. 
24  [2003] UKHL 10 at para 12. 
25  [1960] 3 All ER 1 at  4. 
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Dr El Azra (for the defence): 
 
Dr El Azra had examined the defendant about eight months after his arrest. He 
agreed with Dr Palmer that he was suffering from an abnormality of mind but 
did not consider that there was an alcohol dependence syndrome. Instead, he 
formed the view that the defendant had experienced a transient psychotic state. 
It will be noticed that there was an essential agreement between the two 
psychiatrists that the defendant had been suffering from an abnormality of 
mind, even though there was disagreement as to its precise cause. The first limb 
of s 2(1) was, at least in the experts’ opinion, satisfied. The next element that 
needed to be satisfied was whether this abnormality of mind “substantially 
impaired his mental responsibility”.  The generally accepted approach to this 
issue was set out in Byrne as drawing a distinction between a defendant who 
was capable of resisting the impulse to kill but who did not and the defendant 
who was incapable of resisting such an impulse. Dr Palmer testified that 
although in her view the defendant was suffering from alcohol dependence 
syndrome (sufficient to amount to an abnormality of mind), the alcohol had 
operated merely to remove his disinhibitions and facilitated the release of 
aggression. It was her opinion that the defendant had not lost touch with reality 
and that if he had been sober he would probably have exercised restraint. 
Although the issue was not put in this way by either the Court of Appeal or the 
House of Lords, her testimony effectively amounted to an opinion that this 
defendant was in the position of someone who did not, rather than could not, 
control his impulses. 
Dr El Azra, was of the view that the defendant’s transient psychotic state 
meant that the he had lost touch with reality and falsely believed that his victim 
deserved to die. His opinion was that even if the defendant had had no alcohol, 
he would probably have killed Davies as he did. In short, Dr El Azra’a opinion 
was that this was a defendant who could not control his impulse to kill. 
The application of the defence of diminished responsibility in those 
situations where intoxication had been present, was to ask: would the defendant 
have killed if he had been sober. This analysis is an attempt to separate the 
effect of the intoxication from the “underlying causes” of any abnormality of 
mind. To this question Dr Palmer’s answer was that neither the adjustment 
disorder nor the alcohol dependency syndrome would have prevented the 
defendant from forming the requisite mens rea, i.e. the defendant would not 
have killed if he had been sober.26 Dr El Azra took a diametrically opposite 
view. The intoxication was irrelevant; the defendant would have killed even if 
he had been sober.27
26  [2003] UKHL10, para 14. 
27  Ibid para 13. 
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DIRECTIONS TO THE JURY 
 
Needless to say, it was the content of the trial judge’s directions to the jury 
that formed the basis of the instant appeal. In early cases such as Spriggs, it was 
reckoned sufficient for a trial judge to simply read the s to the jury and invite 
them to apply the law.28 Ever since the leading decision in Byrne, this was no 
longer true; the trial judge is under an obligation to adequately guide the jury.29   
The trial judge summarised the medical evidence and directed the jury as 
follows: 
 
“As you have been told, diminished responsibility is not a 
medical diagnosis, it is a legal concept which ultimately only a 
jury can decide. All that doctors can do is to assist you with the 
benefit of their expertise and experience. As experts they are 
permitted to express opinions But this is trial by jury and you, 
the jury, must decide whether or not diminished responsibility 
has been established.”30
 
Both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords saw no reason to criticise 
this part of the direction.  
In relation to the effect of intoxication, the direction was in two parts The 
first related to the issue raised by Dr Palmer’s opinion that the defendant was 
suffering from an alcohol dependence syndrome, while the second dealt with 
the impact of the intoxication on the abnormality of mind: 
 
“First, if you are persuaded by Dr Palmer that there was an 
alcohol dependence syndrome, you include that in the 
abnormality of mind but only if the defendant’s drinking had 
become involuntary, that is to say he was no longer able to 
resist the impulse to drink. Secondly, - this is an issue of 
crucial importance in this case – once you are satisfied that 
there is an abnormality of mind, whether on the basis of an 
adjustment disorder alone or coupled with a transient psychotic 
state or alcohol dependence syndrome, or however, you must 
28  “I cannot see that a judge dealing with this matter can do more than call the attention 
of the jury to the exact terms of the s parliament has enacted and leave the jury to say 
whether, on the evidence, they are satisfied that the case comes within the s or not”, Per 
Lord Goddard in Spriggs [1958] 1 All ER 300 at 303. 
29  [1960] 3 All ER 1. 
30  [2003] UKHL 10 at para 15. 
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ask these questions: have the defence satisfied you on a balance 
of probabilities that if the defendant had not taken drink (1) he 
would have killed if, in fact, he did; and (2) he would have 
been under diminished responsibility when he did so. If they 
have satisfied you that the answer to both questions is “yes” 
then this is a case of diminished responsibility. But if the 
answer to either question is “no”, then it is not.”31
 
It is worth noting, as was pointed out by the Court of Appeal when dealing 
with the merits of the appeal, that counsel as well as the jury were provided 
with the trial judge’s directions on murder and manslaughter in writing; no 
objections were actually made at trial to those directions.32
 
THE APPEAL CHRONOLOGY 
 
The jury rejected the defence and convicted the defendant of murder. The 
defence sought to appeal on the basis that the above direction was flawed. 
However, leave to appeal was refused by the single judge. This went to appeal 
before the full bench of the Court of Appeal.33 The skeleton argument presented 
at this point submitted that both parts of the direction, above, were not 
appropriate.34 Mr. Gibson, for the appellant, argued that the possibility that the 
intake of alcohol was involuntary was something that should have been put 
more forcefully to the jury. It was also submitted that a reconsideration of the 
authorities was necessary. In particular, criticism was made of the test 
suggested in Tandy35 (which was to the effect that the question of voluntariness 
was to be tested by reference to the test of whether the first drink was voluntary 
or not); this test was submitted to be illogical. Waller LJ was willing to accept 
that all the issues required consideration and granted leave to appeal. In 
particular, his Lordship accepted that there was “some measure of force” in the 
submissions relating to Tandy.36 The Court of Appeal, however, dismissed the 
appeal.37 The House of Lords then granted an application by the defendant 
seeking leave to appeal to the House. This appeal was heard, and, finally, 
31 The directions are taken from the judgment of the Court of Appeal [2001] EWCA 
Crim 2052 at para 10. 
32  Ibid para 8. 
33  [2001] EWCA Crim 502. 
34  See, in particular, para 8–9. 
35  [1989] 1 All ER 267. 
36  [2001] EWCA 502 at para 9. 
37  [2001] EWCA Crim 2052. 
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allowed.38   
  
DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEAL 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal was delivered by Rose LJ, sitting 
with Garland and Sachs JJ. In a  ruling, marked by its brevity, the following 
points were made. 
 
The expert evidence 
 
The defence expert, Dr El Azra was of the opinion that the defendant was 
suffering an adjustment disorder and a transient psychotic state. The Court of 
Appeal noted that defence counsel had conceded that the jury had rejected this 
evidence. Defence counsel had submitted, however, that the manner in which 
the jury had been directed, with regard to the possibility that the alcohol 
dependence could have rendered the actions of the defendant involuntary, had 
been inadequate. Rose LJ pointed out, correctly, that this was an issue which 
went to the evidence that had been presented.39 Dr Palmer, for the Crown, had 
testified as to her opinion that the defendant was suffering from alcohol 
dependence syndrome. This, however, was not sufficient evidence: 
 
“The factors relied on by Dr Palmer as demonstrating alcohol 
dependence syndrome did not include either damage to the 
brain or involuntary intoxication arising from an irresistible 
craving for alcohol. The high point of her evidence, from the 
defendant’s point of view, was that the defendant had “a strong 
desire almost a compulsion” and “he couldn’t stop once he had 
started”. There was no evidence from Dr Palmer on which the 
jury could find that the defendant’s drinking was 
involuntary.”40
 
At first sight, this conclusion seems inconsistent with the Tandy test. If the 
defendant’s first drink was “almost a compulsion” and “he couldn’t stop once 
he had started”, then it would appear that there was evidence that his drinking 
was involuntary. What appeared to be crucial, however, was the defendant’s 
own testimony which, as pointed out above, demonstrated a clear desire to 
downplay the part played by alcohol. This had unfortunate consequences for 
the appeal. According to Rose LJ: 
38  [2003] UKHL 10. 
39  [2001] EWCA Crim 2052 at para 15. 
40  Ibid. 
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“The defendant did not suggest that he had a craving: his 
evidence was that, on this evening, he had drunk rather less 
than usual. Accordingly, the evidence in this case was not 
capable of establishing alcohol dependence syndrome as being 
an abnormality of mind within s 2.”41
 
This was a conclusion supported, according to Rose LJ, by Dr Palmer’s 
further opinion that the alcohol dependence syndrome did not substantially 
impair the defendant’s mental responsibility. Issue may be taken on this point. 
First, the ultimately crucial question as to the existence of substantial 
impairment is a decision to be made by the jury. This would be dependent on a 
proper direction. Since both the experts had concluded that there was an 
abnormality of mind (Dr Palmer basing this on the alcohol dependence 
syndrome; Dr El Azra basing this on a transient psychotic state), the trial judge 
should have given proper directions and left it to the jury. Second, it could be 
argued that while it was proper for the experts to give their opinion as to the 
first limb of s 2 (the possible existence of an abnormality of mind), the experts 
should not have been asked their opinion as to the second limb (whether it 
substantially impaired mental responsibility). Under the rules of evidence, this 
relates to the “ultimate issue” that lies within the province of the jury. For the 
experts to answer this question would amount to the usurpation of the jury’s 
proper function, quite apart from the fact that, as Byrne puts it, this is a matter 
“incapable of scientific proof”.42 Admittedly, there is considerable doubt as to 
whether the evidential prohibition relating to the ultimate issue (which has been 
abolished in civil matters) still exists in criminal cases The Criminal Law 
Revision Committee had recommended abolition43 but this had never been 
enacted. The prevailing view has been that such questions may be permitted, 
and the answers received but only if the jury is properly directed that they are 
entitled to disregard the opinion. This is an unsatisfactory position. A jury 
cannot but be influenced unduly by expert evidence on matters as complex as 
mental capacity. Moreover, there was here a submission that this proper 
direction was lacking. 
 
The decision in Tandy 
 
In granting leave to appeal, Waller LJ had accepted that there was some force in 
the submission that the decision in Tandy needed to be reviewed. Rose LJ took 
41  Ibid. 
42  Below n 45. 
43  Eleventh Report (Cmnd 4491), clause 43. 
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the view that there was no incompatibility between Tandy and the previous case 
law: 
In line with those authorities, Tandy established that drink is only capable 
of giving rise to a defence under s 2 if it either causes damage to the brain or 
produces an irresistible craving so that consumption is involuntary.44
In other words, a difficulty in resisting the craving is not sufficient; it has to 
be an inability to resist. The problem lies in distinguishing “difficulty” from 
“inability” when dealing with the issue of rational choice. It is, at least, 
arguable as to whether even a properly directed jury would be capable of 
drawing a distinction which is not merely semantic but raises profound 
questions as to a moral / blameworthy exercise of choice. Moreover, the Court 
of Appeal in Byrne had been willing to accept that a difficulty in exercising 
self-control in certain circumstances may be sufficient.45 Rose LJ, however, 
sought to distinguish this part of the case by pointing out that in Byrne no 
question of intoxication arose or was even considered. It is submitted that this 
point of distinction was irrelevant. 
 
The “Smith” questions 
 
In the case of Gittens the Court of Appeal had considered the appropriate 
direction to be given to the jury in those situations where there was some 
evidence of intoxication: 
 
“[T]he jury should be directed to disregard what, in their view, 
the effect of the alcohol or drugs upon the defendant was, since 
abnormality of mind induced by alcohol or drugs is not 
(generally speaking) due to inherent causes and is not therefore 
within the s. Then the jury should consider whether the 
combined effect of the other matters which do fall within the s 
amounted to such abnormality of mind as substantially 
impaired the defendant’s mental responsibility.”46
 
In his Commentary on Gittens, Professor Sir John Smith QC had 
reformulated this ruling into what came to be referred to as the “Smith 
questions”.47 The consequent judicial reliance on this formulation had 
converted it into, to all practical purposes, a model direction. The trial judge in 
the instant case had followed this practice. It is worth setting out the questions 
44  [2001] EWCA Crim 2052, para 13. 
45  Byrne [1960] 3 All ER 1, 5, at para D - E. 
46  Gittens (1984) 79 Cr App R 272, at 277. 
47  Commentary [1984] Crim LR 553. 
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again: 
 
“… you must ask these questions: have the defence satisfied 
you on a balance of probabilities that if the defendant had not 
taken drink (1) he would have killed if, in fact, he did and; (2) 
he would have been under diminished responsibility when he 
did so. If they have satisfied you that the answer to both 
questions is “yes”, then this is a case of diminished 
responsibility. But if the answer to either question is “no”, then 
it is not.”48
 
Counsel for the defendant now submitted that Professor Smith had 
misunderstood the decision in Gittens He further submitted that the “Smith 
questions” placed undue pre-eminence to causation, which is not the same thing 
as impairment of mental responsibility. The essence of the submission was that 
the “Smith questions” could operate only if it was first accepted that an 
abnormality could impair mental responsibility if, and only if, it was the sole 
cause of the killing. It was contended that such an interpretation was 
unsupported either by the Act itself or the cases. 
Rose LJ dismissed the submissions on a number of grounds49 First, in his 
judgement the “Smith questions” accurately reflected the decision of the Court 
of Appeal in Gittens Second, in subsequent cases (such as Atkinson50 and 
Egan51) the “Smith questions” were not only expressly approved but the 
challenge to their compatibility with the decision in Gittens was firmly rejected. 
These decisions were binding on the present Court. Third, as noted above, there 
has to be an inability, not just a difficulty, in exercising self-control. 
On this basis Rose LJ ruled that there was no grounds for regarding the 
conviction as unsafe and dismissed the appeal. 
 
DECISION OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS52
 
Having concluded that the decision of the Court of Appeal raised a point of 
law of general importance which ought to be considered by the House of Lords, 
the certified question was as follows: 
 
(1) Does a Defendant seeking to prove a defence of diminished 
48  [2001] EWCA Crim 205, at para 10. 
49 Ibid at para 13. 
50  (1985) Cr App LR 314. 
51  [1992] 4 All ER 267. 
52 [2003] UKHL 10. 
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responsibility under s 2(1) of the Homicide Act 1957 in a case where he 
had taken drink prior to killing the victim, have to show that if he had not 
taken drink 
(i) he would have killed as he in fact did; and 
(ii) he would have been under diminished responsibility when he 
did so? 
(2) If not, what direction ought to be given to a jury as to the approach to be 
taken to self-induced intoxication which was present at the material time in 
conjunction with an abnormality of mind which falls within s 2(1) of the 
1957 Act. 
 
Lord Hutton delivered the unanimous opinion of the House of Lords.53 
After summarising the facts and the expert evidence, Lord Hutton began by 
considering the interpretation of s 2(1) of the Act and then dealt with the 
relevant authorities and the appropriate jury directions. 
 
Interpretation of s 2(1) 
 
The starting point was simple enough. If the defendant was able to satisfy the 
jury that, regardless of the alcohol he had consumed, the killing was caused by 
an abnormality of mind which substantially impaired his mental responsibility, 
then he was entitled to a verdict of manslaughter. Lord Hutton explained the 
basis of his view: 
 
“I take this view because I think that in referring to substantial 
impairment of mental responsibility the subs does not require 
the abnormality of mind to be the sole cause of the defendant’s 
acts in doing the killing.”54
 
This view, which accords with the submissions that had been made before 
the Court of Appeal, is entirely consistent with s 2(1): the defendant “shall not 
be convicted of murder if he was suffering from such an abnormality of mind 
… as substantially impaired his mental responsibility…” This is a crucial point, 
one ignored by the Court of Appeal, and further explained by Lord Hutton: 
 
“In my opinion, even if the defendant would not have killed if 
he had not taken drink, the causative effect of the drink does 
not necessarily prevent an abnormality of mind suffered by the 
defendant from substantially impairing his mental 
53 Lords Nicholls, Lloyd, Hobhouse and Rodger all concurred. 
54 Para 18. 
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responsibility for his fatal acts”.55
 
In other words, and it is a point worth emphasising, even if the 
consumption of alcohol had played a part in the killing (i.e. the defendant 
would not have killed if he had not taken drink), this would not prevent an 
underlying abnormality of mind suffered by the defendant from substantially 
impairing his mental responsibility. This marks a departure from the analysis 
that had previously been accepted as standard practice. 
It is submitted that this approach is correct. A number of different situations 
may arise.56 First, there is the situation which arises when the defendant pleads 
the “defence” of intoxication. This may be taken into account in deciding 
whether it negates the mens rea for murder but is irrelevant to s 2(1) of the 
1957 Act. The second situation occurs where the defendant presents evidence 
that the consumption of alcohol is involuntary and represents an alcohol 
dependence syndrome. This may amount to the “inherent cause” or “disease” 
contained within the parenthesis in s 2(1). The Court of Appeal in the instant 
case had ruled that the evidence was not capable of establishing such a 
syndrome. While this may be open to some dispute, as argued above, this ruling 
was not challenged before the House of Lords Consequently, the attempt to 
review the decision in Tandy had to be abandoned for the time being at least. 
The third situation would occur where a defendant, who may be suffering from 
an underlying condition of abnormality of mind, goes on to consume alcohol 
and then pleads the s 2(1) defence. To ignore the underlying abnormality of 
mind would be to require that it had to be the sole cause for the killing, instead 
of accepting, as a matter of causation, that it was sufficient if it was a 
substantial cause (i.e. anything other than a minimal cause). It was the failure 
by the previous cases to fully acknowledge these distinctions that had caused 
the confusion.  
 
Review of the authorities 
 
Fenton:57 here was no doubt that the alcohol had played an important 
part. In fact, The defendant, having consumed a large quantity of alcohol, shot 
and killed four people. The medical witnesses all agreed that he was suffering 
from an abnormality of mind based on four ingredients First, he was an 
aggressive psychotic with marked paranoid traits Second, the various stresses to 
which he had been subject had produced a state of reactive depression. The 
55 Ibid. 
56 A similar set of distinctions is drawn in Wilson Criminal Law: Doctrine and Theory 
(London: Longman, 2nd edn, 2003) p 246. 
57 (1975) 61 Cr App R 261. 
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third ingredient was the excessive quantity of alcohol with a resulting state of 
disinhibition and confusion. Fourth, there had been a police car chase and a 
final sensation of being trapped. This was considered as a “last straw” 
phenomenon. The medical evidence was that in the absence of any of these four 
ingredients, the killings would probably not have occurred. Lord Widgery CJ 
stated that: 
 
“the jury later disclosed in reply to an observation of the 
learned judge that they were unanimously of the view that the 
killings would not have occurred if the appellant had not had so 
much to drink.”58
 
However, this did not prevent a possible conclusion that the effect of the 
remaining ingredients was sufficient to cause a substantial impairment of 
mental responsibility. As Lord Hutton commented: 
 
“This was a case where it was clear that the killings would not 
have taken place if the appellant had not taken drink, but 
nevertheless the trial judge left it to the jury to consider if the 
combined effect of the factors other than alcohol was sufficient 
to amount to a substantial impairment of his mental 
responsibility, and the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge 
had properly left this issue to the jury.”59
 
Turnbull (Launcelot)60: The defendant had gone drinking with his victim, 
subsequently killing him. He sought to rely on diminished responsibility on the 
basis of medical evidence that he was a psychopath. This was rejected by the 
jury. The trial judge had begun with a direction based on Fenton. Then, dealing 
with the impact of the alcohol, the trial judge told the jury that if they took the 
view that, 
 
“if he had not taken drink this would not have happened, then 
the defence would have failed to prove that the abnormality of 
mind substantially diminished Turnbull’s responsibility for his 
act in killing.”61
 
Lord Widgery, delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, refused to 
58 Ibid at 263. 
59 Para 21. 
60 (1977) 65 Cr App R 242. 
61 Ibid at 246 
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accept the criticisms that were made of these directions and ruled that the jury 
had not been misled from the proper approach. Lord Hutton, did not take the 
same benevolent view, describing the trial judge’s directions as inconsistent 
with that of Fenton. Moreover, he ruled, the Court of Appeal in Turnbull did 
not intend to lay down any principle. This was, indeed, the conclusion reached 
by a subsequent Court of Appeal in Gittens. 
 
Gittens:62 The defendant had been suffering from depression and had attempted 
to hang himself. He had been hospitalised and on a visit home, after consuming 
a quantity of alcohol as well as pills that had been prescribed for him, he killed 
his wife and step-daughter. Three doctors called by the defence testified that he 
was suffering from an abnormality of mind which substantially impaired his 
mental responsibility. Two of these witnesses considered that this was due to a 
depressive illness, the third concluded that this was due to a disorder of the 
personality induced by psychological injury. The expert called on behalf of the 
prosecution also agreed that there was an abnormality of mind but concluded 
that this was brought on by the alcohol and the drugs and was neither inherent 
nor the result of illness It is apparent that the trial judge’s directions borrowed 
heavily on Turnbull (Launcelot). This time, however, the Court of Appeal took 
a different view: 
 
“Even assuming that the direction approved in Reg v Turnbull 
(Launcelot) taken as a whole was correct, we consider that it is 
not a direction which should in future be copied.”63
 
Lord Hutton summarised the four points which emerge form the decision in 
Gittens as follows: 
 
(i) Where a defendant suffers from an abnormality of mind arising 
from arrested or retarded development of mind or inherent causes 
or induced by disease or injury and has also taken drink before the 
killing, the abnormality of mind and the effect of the drink may 
each play a part in impairing the defendant’s mental responsibility 
for the killing. 
(ii) Therefore the task for the jury is to decide whether, despite the 
disinhibiting effect of the drink on the defendant’s mind, the 
abnormality of mind arising from a cause specified in subs 2(1) 
nevertheless substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his 
fatal acts 
62 [1984] QB 698. 
63 Ibid p 701 
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(iii) Accordingly it is not correct for the judge to direct the jury that 
unless they are satisfied that if the defendant had not taken drink he 
would have killed, the defence of diminished responsibility must 
fail. Such a direction is incorrect because it fails to recognise that 
the abnormality of mind arising from a cause specified in the subs 
and the effect of the drink may each play a part in impairing the 
defendant’s mental responsibility for the killing. 
(iv) The direction given by the trial judge in Turnbull (Launcelot) 
should not be followed. 
 
The “Smith questions” 
 
Professor Sir John Smith, as noted above, had formulated the questions that 
have to be put to the jury as follows: 
 
“Have the defence satisfied you on the balance of probabilities 
– that, if the defendant had not taken drink – 
(i) he would have killed as he in fact did? And 
(ii) he would have been under diminished responsibility when he did 
so?”64 
 
In two subsequent cases, Atkinson65 and Egan,66 the Court of Appeal 
approved of the “Smith questions”. Lord Hutton, however, expressed 
reservations as to both these decisions In the light of his Lordships views these 
cases must now be regarded as of limited value.67 While paying tribute to the 
legal scholarship of the late Professor Sir John Smith, Lord Hutton was forced 
to concluded that the “Smith questions” were not entirely correct: 
 
“I consider, with respect, that this commentary placed undue 
reliance on the direction by the judge and the judgment of the 
court of Appeal in Turnbull and did not give sufficient weight 
to the subsequent judgment of the Court of Appeal in Gittens 
which makes it clear that the direction in Turnbull should not 
in future be followed …”68
 
Lord Hutton went on to point out that even if the jury came to the 
64 Commentary [1984] Crim LR 554. 
65 [1985] Crim LR 314. 
66 [1992] 4 All ER 470. 
67 See, in particular, para 37. 
68 At para 32. 
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conclusion that the effective cause of the killing was the intoxication, this did 
not prevent a further finding of diminished responsibility: 
 
“… even if the jury answered “No” to the question: “Have the 
defence satisfied you on the balance of probabilities that, if the 
defendant had not taken drink, he would have killed as he in 
fact did? – it is still open to the jury to find the defence of 
diminished responsibility established.”69
 
In other words, while the defendant’s consumption of alcohol is to be left 
out of account (in those instances where it does not amount to an inherent cause 
i.e. amounting to alcohol dependence syndrome), it may have a disinhibiting 
effect. The jury may take this into account in coming to a conclusion as to 
whether, despite the alcohol consumed, the defendant’s underlying mental 
responsibility did or did not substantially impair his mental responsibility. 
Support for this approach was gleaned from Simester and Sullivan in their text 
on Criminal Law Theory and Practice: 
 
“… the taking of intoxicants should not disentitle D from 
successfully pleading diminished responsibility if the 
abnormality of mind caused by factors internal to [him] is 
sufficient, of itself, substantially to impair [his] mental 
responsibility. … The drink does not supervene over his 
underlying subnormality. That underlying condition remains, 
and so does the question whether that condition substantially 
impaired his responsibility for the killing.”70
 
This does not alter the policy of the criminal law: a defendant who is 
“merely” intoxicated would not be excused. The essential difference between a 
person who is brain-damaged but is also intoxicated and a defendant who is 
intoxicated but not brain-damaged, is maintained.71  Moreover, as Lord Hutton 
rightly pointed out, in the majority of cases “if the jury concluded that the 
defendant would not have killed if he had not taken drink they will also find 
that his abnormality of mind had not substantially impaired his mental 
responsibility for his fatal acts.”72  
The first part of the question before the House of Lords asked: “does a 
defendant have to show that if he had not taken drink, he would have killed as 
69 Ibid. 
70 Para 34. 
71 At para 40 this was a point made by Lord Rodger during the Crown’s submissions. 
72 Para 34. 
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he in fact did?” In the light of the above analysis, Lord Hutton answered this 
question in the negative.73
 
The appropriate jury directions 
 
The second part of the certified question asked for the appropriate jury 
direction in those situations where self-induced intoxication was present in 
conjunction with an abnormality of mind. Lord Hutton began with the aphorism 
that it was not possible to lay down a precise form of words; much depends on 
the facts that are before each trial judge. Nonetheless, it was possible to provide 
guidelines. It is worth setting this out in full: 
 
“Assuming that the defence have established that the defendant 
was suffering from mental abnormality as described in s 2, the 
important question is: did that abnormality substantially impair 
his mental responsibility for his acts in doing the killing? You 
know that before he carried out the killing the defendant had 
had a lot to drink. Drink cannot be taken into account as 
something which contributed to his mental abnormality and to 
any impairment of mental responsibility arising from that 
abnormality. But you may take the view that both the 
defendant’s mental abnormality and drink played a part in 
impairing his mental responsibility for the killing and that he 
might not have killed if he had not taken drink. If you take that 
view, then the question for you to decide is this: has the 
defendant satisfied you that, despite the drink, his mental 
abnormality substantially impaired his mental responsibility for 
his fatal acts, or has he failed to satisfy you of that? If he has 
satisfied you of that, you will find him not guilty of murder but 
you may find him guilty of manslaughter. If he has not satisfied 





The House of Lords then remitted the case to the Court of Appeal for a 
decision as to whether the conviction for murder ought to be quashed and a new 
trial ordered or to substitute a verdict of guilty of manslaughter. The Court of 
Appeal subsequently held that the public interest, in the context of the serious 
73 Para 41. 
74 Ibid. 
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offence of murder, required a retrial. The Court acknowledged that a substantial 
amount of time had elapsed but, nonetheless, a retrial could be fair. The failing 
of the law had now been corrected, a trial judge would now be equipped with a 
proper direction and a new jury needed to decide if the defendant should still be 
convicted of murder.75
Welcome as this decision may be, the fact remains that many issues remain 
unresolved. The basic tensions between the legal and psychiatric analyses 
continue. This has a fundamental impact on the reception of expert evidence. 
As this case illustrates, both the experts for the Crown as well as the defence 
agreed that the defendant was suffering from an abnormality of mind. Is it not 
the case that even a properly directed jury will continue to have difficulties with 
drawing a distinction between the expert conclusion and their own view as 
whether this went on to cause a substantial impairment of mental 
responsibility? In the light of the ruling in Byrne that the jury should take a 
“broad common sense approach” when dealing with the abnormality of mind, 
the proper place of the expert psychiatric evidence remains problematic. 
Moreover, a number of policy and analytical issues were not addressed. 
Two of these are worth noting. First, the House of Lords makes no comment on 
whether it continues to be permissible to direct the jury on diminished 
responsibility in terms of “partial insanity”. Second, in Tandy76, the Court of 
Appeal had dealt with the issue of whether the consumption of alcohol was 
voluntary or not by posing the so-called “first drink of the day” question. It had 
been argued in the courts below that this approach was illogical and incorrect. 
The House of Lords chose not to deal with this issue. Since other parts of the 
Tandy ruling were treated with approval, may it be assumed that this approach 
was also to be approved? 
In terms of wider policy, the question still remains: what difference does it 
make whether insanity or diminished responsibility is used? As far as the 
disposal and sentence of the defendant is concerned, the end result is likely to 
be the same. This is illustrated by the Peter Sutcliffe case. Here the trial judge 
refused to countenance the prosecution’s acceptance of a plea of guilty to 
manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility. Following a full trial 
and a conviction for murder, he was within a matter of months, transferred to a 
secure mental hospital, where he would have been if the original plea had been 
accepted. It is true, of course, that the trial for murder had a symbolic function 
but as Norrie puts it: 
  
“At the end of the court process, when the symbolic games 
have been played, the practical effects of the different findings 
75 LTL 11/4/2003 Extempore. 
76 [1989] 1 All ER 267. 
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in law are largely irrelevant. Having struggled to understand 
the elaborate and confusing categories of insanity and 
diminished responsibility, law students are often bemused to 
find that, practically, at the end of the day, it does not make 
much odds one way or another which legal category is 
applied.”77
 
The progress of the instant appeal had been, to say the least, tortuous. After 
the original trial there had followed: an application for leave to appeal before 
the Court of Appeal; an appeal on the merits before the Court of Appeal; an 
appeal to the House of Lords; a further hearing by the Court of Appeal to 
decide whether to order a re-trial; and finally a re-hearing before the Crown 
Court. All in all, sixteen judges, Lords Justices and Law Lords had been 
involved in this case in one way or another. There ought to be a better way to 





77 Loc cit, p 196. 
